Wissenschaft und bildung in der mathematik des 19. Jahrhunderts By Hans Niels Jahnke. Bielefeld, BRD (Institüt für Didaktik der Mathematik, Universität Bielefeld). 1981 by unknown
104 Reviews HM 11 
WISSENSCHAFT UND BILDUNG IN DER MATHEMATIK DES 19. JAHRHUNDERTS. 
By Hans Niels Jahnke. Bielefeld, BRD (Insti& fiir Didaktik 
der Mathematik, Universitst Bielefeld). 1981. 
Reviewed by Linda Wessels 
Department of History and Philosophy of Science, 
Indiana University, Bloomington, IN 47405 
HOW did the ideas on education of the French Enlightenment in 
the late eighteenth century agree and disagree with those of the 
German New Humanists in the early nineteenth century, and how did 
the latter ideas affect the development of German mathematics in 
the nineteenth century? These are the main questions that Jahnke 
addresses in the present monograph. It is a preliminary report 
(vorl%fige Bericht) on a project currently being pursued by 
Jahnke entitled (in translation) "On the Relation between the 
Processes of Science and Education as Exemplified in the Develop- 
ment of Mathematics in the Nineteenth Century." This preliminary 
report focuses primarily on the comparison of the ideas of the 
French Enlightenment and German New Humanism on the purposes and 
methods of education, on the nature and methods of science, and 
on the relation between science and education, with particular 
attention to the role of science in the school curriculum. Almost 
two-thirds of the monograph's 52 pages are devoted to these topics. 
Another (roughly) one-fourth is devoted to urging that the concern 
with problems of education among the New Humanists brought about 
in scientists themselves a new recognition of the subjective ele- 
ments in science. Less than one-tenth of the monograph addresses 
directly the question of how these ideas on science and education, 
and this concern with the problems of education, actually influ- 
enced the development of nineteenth-century German mathematics. 
Here are Jahnke's main theses. It is usually said that the 
ideas of the French Enlightenment and German New Humanism on the 
role of science in education differ in the following way: accord- 
ing to the Enlightenment position, the purpose of science educa- 
tion is to train students for a career and to promote new prac- 
tical applications of science; the New Humanists, on the other 
hand, thought that learning science was an essential part of the 
experience necessary to fully develop the intellectual, cultural, 
and spiritual potential of each student (Bildung). This standard 
account, according to Jahnke, is wrong. Both the Enlightenment 
and New Humanism were part of a general turn-of-the-century trend 
toward developing science education. Both saw the inclusion of 
science in the school curriculum as a means of overcoming the 
elite character of scientific knowledge. The differences between 
the two movements lie elsewhere. The emphasis in the Enlighten- 
ment was on language, One must search for an ideal language for 
science, one that is perfect for both the teaching of science and 
the doing of science. "Science is a language," according to the 
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Enlightenment (according to Jahnke). This led the Enlightenment 
to look for an a priori basis for science, and to ignore the sub- 
jective elements of science, i.e., the practical, political, social, 
and organizational aspects. It was Kant who made the Germans aware 
of the subjective elements in science. The educators and scientists 
of early nineteenth-century Germany (read Prussia), and New Human- 
ists in general, began to see science as part of a larger cultural 
and historical setting; they attempted to analyze the relations 
between scientific knowledge and "every-day knowledge," and also 
the relations among the various scientific specialties themselves; 
they came to recognize the effects of technology (printing, experi- 
mental technique, the media) on the development of science (and 
education). This new awareness was at least in part a product of 
the vital interest that the New Humanists had in improving educa- 
tion in general, and science education in particular. Concern with 
problems of education also led to more careful examinations of sci- 
entific method, of the foundations of the sciences, and of the 
relation between linguistic and mathematical symbols and the ob- 
jects referred to by those symbols. The New Humanists came to rec- 
ognize the important distinction between content and form in educa- 
tion (the important thing in education is not the content of what 
a student learns, but "learning to learn"), and to recognize that 
scientific concepts and foundations are only subjective, temporary, 
and relative. The recognition of the subjective aspects of science 
and the relativity of scientific foundations, the concern with the 
relation between symbol and object, and the distinguishing of form 
and content led to a rejection of the "metaphysical view of mathe- 
matics." This rejection, in turn, influenced the development of 
non-Euclidian geometry and the move to arithmetize mathematics. 
The reader of this review may find some of these claims triv- 
ial, some of them interesting, some implausible; and he may, per- 
haps, be unsure of what some of them mean. A reading of the mono- 
graph would do little to change these reactions. The evidence for 
most of the claims consists of either selected quotations from 
turn-of-the-century writers (Condillac, Condorcet, Lavoisier, 
Schelling, Fichte, W. ir. Humboldt, Schleiermacher, Crelle, Eolzano) 
or references to the results of recent studies by contemporary his- 
torians of science. There is little hard evidence provided for the 
claimed historical links between specific ideas that arose in the 
discussion of educational issues, on the one hand, and specific 
developments either in mathematics itself or in more general anal- 
yses of method and foundations, on the other. Many apparently key 
terms and phrases are left quite vague. For example: Who and 
what is included in the Enlightenment movement for Jahnke? Exactly 
what are the "subjective aspects of science" whose recognition was 
so important to the New Humanists? The category becomes so broad 
that it is hard to imagine what does not fall under it and hard to 
see the specific significance of its recognition. What is the 
"metaphysical view of mathematics" whose rejection was so important, 
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and in exactly what way was it important? The special section 
introducing "three analytical categories" for use in history of 
science analyses oriented toward social history (sozialgeschicht- 
lich orientierte wissenschaftshistorische Analysen) only makes 
matters worse. 
Perhaps it is unfair to complain of gaps and vagueness in a 
preliminary report. The questions Jahnke raises are indeed 
interesting. If Jahnke's final report on his project contains 
crisp, clear, tightly argued answers to them, it will be a welcome 
and significant contribution to our understanding of the dynamics 
of scientific and social development. 
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What is Functional Analysis? At first glance it seems dif- 
ficult to give a precise answer to this question even for a 
mathematician working in the field. The domain is huge and uses 
extremely different methods. For instance, what are the relations 
between Sobolev spaces, nonlinear functional analysis, categorical 
methods, non-Archimedean functional analysis, abstract harmonic 
analysis, topological and bornological algebras? Jean Dieudonne' 
suggests the definition "the study of topological vector spaces 
and mappings u:n + F from a part fi of a topological vector space 
E into a topological vector space F, these mappings being assumed 
to satisfy various algebraic and topological conditions," which 
is broad enough to include most interesting parts of the domain. 
As Dieudonng says, functional analysis appears as a complex blend 
of algebra and topology, but now perhaps it would be better to 
add the theory of functions of one or several complex variables. 
The very interesting book under review is a development of 
a previous short history of functional analysis given in Dieudonne 
[19781. In this concise survey the author insists more strongly 
on the classical origins (calculus of variations, differential 
and partial differential equations, potential theory, moment prob- 
lem) than on the subsequent evolution. In his book he shows that 
set theory, general topology, linear algebra, the Lebesgue inte- 
gral, and measure theory slowly introduced more and more abstract 
methods to solve classical problems and even created new natural 
problems. 
I will give a very quick description of the contents of the 
chapters. Chapter I contains a discussion of the historical ori- 
